Executives Should Think Twice
Before Accepting Pleas ‘Relating
to Fraud’: the Expansion of Exclusion
Under the Park Doctrine
By Abraham Gitterman
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ver the last three years, the Health Care Fraud
Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT)
has recovered over $10.2 billion in healthcare fraud
settlements, many involving pharmaceutical companies
charged with the “off-label promotion” of drugs to healthcare
providers.1 As an effort to change corporate culture, each of
these settlements has included a corporate integrity agreement
(CIA) with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
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he deterrent efect of CIA’s, however, has been questioned,2
and even OIG has demonstrated that billion dollar settlements
are not a suicient deterrent to change corporate culture.3
While some alternatives have been ofered,4 OIG has responded by indicating its intent to exclude corporate executives in
the life sciences industry from federal healthcare programs
“under a broader range of circumstances,”5 including the
responsible corporate oicer (RCO) doctrine. FDA has also
indicated its intent to use the RCO doctrine in guidance issued
in February 2011.6 By excluding corporate oicers, OIG said
it could “inluence corporate behavior without putting patient
access to care at risk” and “alter the cost-beneit calculus of the
corporate executives who run these companies.”7
Holding true to their promise, HHS excluded three former
Purdue Frederick Company (“Purdue”) executives in 2007 for
their misdemeanor misbranding convictions under the RCO
doctrine. On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
www.fdli.org
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District of Columbia Circuit upheld their
exclusions in Friedman v. Sebelius because
the executives’ misdemeanor convictions
were factually related to fraud. he court,
however, remanded the case back to the
district court regarding the 12-year exclusion length because HHS failed to explain
why the penalty was three times longer
than penalties imposed in comparable cases in the past8 and four times longer than
the presumptive baseline in the statute.9
Consequently, lawyers and healthcare
stakeholders must closely examine this
decision because OIG may “expand its
use of [permissive] exclusion against
individuals”10 and the decision may
encourage more RCO prosecutions. As
a result, these exclusions may have the
unintended consequence of deterring
“talented, qualiied, and ethical individuals from working in senior or leadership
positions in the”11 life sciences industry
for fear of being excluded when they
engaged in no wrongful conduct.

Case Background
In May 2007, Purdue pled guilty to
felony misbranding, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 331(a) and § 333(a)(2) of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
because some of Purdue’s employees made
misrepresentations to healthcare providers that the painkiller Oxycontin was less
addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and
withdrawal than other pain medications.12
Purdue was placed on probation for ive
years, ined $500,000, and sufered other
monetary sanctions totaling approximately $600 million, of which approximately
$160 million was earmarked for restitution
to Federal and State healthcare agencies.13
At the same time, the three executives14 each pled guilty to a single count of
misdemeanor misbranding as “responsible corporate oicers” under the RCO
doctrine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)
FDLI

and § 333(a)(1), for their admitted failure
to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent marketing
of OxyContin. Under the RCO doctrine,
criminal liability for an FDCA violation
does not require “awareness of some
wrongdoing” or “conscious fraud.”15 In
Friedman, the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that because the executives, as part of
their plea agreements, admitted having
“responsibility and authority either to
prevent in the irst instance or to promptly correct” the of-label promotion, the
executives admitted being guilty of misdemeanor misbranding under the RCO
doctrine.16 However, both the presiding
judge who accepted the corporate and executive plea agreements and the prosecuting U.S. Attorney recognized the absence
of any proof that the executives had any
personal knowledge of the misbranding
or any personal intent to defraud.17
Nevertheless, the court’s holding established an unfamiliar precedent because
unlike the seminal RCO cases, U.S. v.
Dotterweich18 and U.S. v. Park, in which
the penalties were “relatively small” and
conviction did no “grave damage” to the
person’s reputation,19 the executives in
Friedman had to disgorge approximately
$34.5 million in compensation and faced
what amounted to a lifetime ban from
the pharmaceutical industry.
Four months ater the executives were
sentenced, OIG informed them of its
intent to exclude them from participating
in any federal healthcare program for 20
years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)
(1), which authorizes OIG to exclude an
individual convicted of a “misdemeanor
relating to fraud, thet, embezzlement,
breach of iduciary responsibility, or
other inancial misconduct.” he executives appealed OIG’s determination to
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and
ultimately to the Departmental Appeals
Board (DAB). While OIG reduced the ex-

clusion to 15 years because the executives
had assisted law enforcement authorities
to combat abuse of OxyContin, the DAB
airmed the exclusion, only reducing its
length to 12 years because there was no
substantial evidence that the misbranded
Oxycontin had any adverse efect on program beneiciaries and others. he U.S.
District Court upheld the exclusion.

Expanding Exclusion Under the
RCO Doctrine
he Friedman case presented the
question of whether the phrase “misdemeanor relating to fraud” in section
1320a-7(b)(1)(A) refers to a (1) generic
criminal ofense—the categorical approach—or (2) to the facts underlying the
particular defendant’s conviction—the
circumstance-speciic approach.
he “categorical approach,” according
to which the statutory term refers to the
generic criminal ofense, “prohibits the
later court from delving into particular
facts disclosed by the record of conviction” and directs that court to “look only
to the fact of conviction and the statutory
deinition of the prior ofense,” including the elements of that ofense.20 Under
the “circumstance-speciic” approach,
by contrast, the statutory term refers to
the particular conduct giving rise to the
conviction and so the court “must look to
the facts and circumstances underlying
an ofender’s conviction” to determine
whether that conviction is covered by
the statute.21 he court reasoned that the
text, structure, and purpose of the exclusion statute indicated that the Secretary’s
circumstance-speciic approach was
proper. he court, however, noted a “split
in authority on the question whether to
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a
term drawn from criminal law but used
in a statute the agency administers.”22
he key phrase in the exclusion statute
the court used to uphold the executives’
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exclusions was “relating to,” which the
court broadly deined as “stand[ing] in
some relation; to have bearing or concern;
to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with.’”23 Using this
deinition, the court reasoned that ‘relating to’ “includes any criminal conduct
that has a factual “connection with” or
reference to fraud.24 he court explained
that “relating to fraud” modiies “misdemeanor” and that a “conviction,” meant a
particular event on a particular occasion
and “so refers to a set of facts, and not to a
generic crime.”25 Consequently, the court
explained that “Misdemeanor misbranding does not necessarily require a culpable
mental state” like generic misdemeanors
“because a conviction for the ofense may
be, and in this case was, predicated upon
the responsible corporate oicer doctrine,
which entails strict liability.”26
Pointing to the “broad scope” of 1320a7(b)(1)(A), the court used three examples to
support its position. First, the court maintained that exclusion for a misdemeanor
relating to “other inancial misconduct”
“expressly refers to a type of ‘conduct,’ not
to a genus of criminal ofense.”27 herefore, the term “misdemeanor” refers to the
particular circumstances of an individual’s
conviction, and “relating to” must denote
a factual relationship between the conduct
underlying the misdemeanor and the
conduct underlying a “fraud.”28
Second, the court reasoned that the limiting clause in section (b)(1)(B) “does not
pick out a generic class of ofenses because
there is no generic crime of defrauding a
program other than a healthcare program
inanced in whole or in part by a government agency.”29 As a result, the court
explained that the “criminal ofense” must
“relate to fraud” because it has a factual
relationship to conduct involving a program inanced by a government agency,
committed on a particular occasion.
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hird, the court explained that the
phrase “the use of funds” in section
1320a-7(b)(2)(ii) does not refer to a generic
ofense and therefore must refer to speciic
facts on a particular occasion. As a result,
the court maintained that “related to” in
this provision denotes a factual connection between an “investigation or audit”
and “the use of funds.” Accordingly, the
court asserted that “he only reasonable interpretation is that in all three
provisions the phrases refer to a factual
relationship.”30 he Court also reasoned
that the heading of section 1320a-7(b)(1)
(“Conviction relating to fraud”) further
supports this reading of the provision.
he court then evaluated the three aggravating factors OIG relied on to exclude
the executives for 12 years—(1) the conduct underlying the convictions lasting
more than one year, (2) the amount of
the inancial loss, and (3) the signiicant
adverse physical or mental impact upon
program beneiciaries. First, the Court
rejected the argument that there was
no inancial loss because Purdue paid
$160 million in “restitution,” which the
executives admitted responsibility for and
because Purdue generated almost $3 billion in revenues from OxyContin during
the time it misbranded the drug,” much
of which came from Federal and State
healthcare programs that would not have
been paid for but for the misbranding.31
Second, while the executives’ violations consisted solely of omissions,
rather than “acts,” the Court concluded
that HHS’ interpretation equating the
two terms when only “acts” are proscribed was a permissible one.32 hird,
the Court rejected the executives’ argument that HHS gave insuicient weight
to their cooperation with law enforcement agencies because the executives did
not show that the Secretary had abused
her discretion.33

he Court however, agreed with the executives that there was substantial evidence
that HHS did not take into account the executives’ lack of “conscious wrongdoing” as
a mitigating factor.34 he Court also found
that the length of the executives’ exclusion
was arbitrary and capricious because (1)
every case cited by HHS involved a mandatory exclusion with a presumptive baseline
of ive years, not a discretionary exclusion
with a presumptive baseline of three years;
(2) every case cited involved either a felony
or Medicare fraud conviction for which
the defendant was incarcerated, which was
not present in this case; and (3) “none of
the cases cited even concerned an exclusion under section 1320a-7(b)(1),” and HHS
“had never excluded anyone for more than
ten years” based upon a misdemeanor—the
longest was four years.35

Conclusion/
Recommendations
While the Purdue executives may ile a
petition for a rehearing by the entire D.C.
Circuit, this case will have signiicant
repercussions for those in the healthcare industry for several reasons. First,
the decision likely will deter corporate
healthcare executives from agreeing to
pleas under the RCO doctrine because
doing so could lead to exclusion, which
would efectively end their careers even
where the exclusionary period is signiicantly less than 12 years. As a result, it
may be more diicult for the government
and corporate defendants to resolve these
types of cases through pleas, which may
lead to increased litigation and related
costs. Executives, however, may still
be forced to accept a misdemeanor plea
because prosecutors may threaten them
with indictments under a felony charge,
which could result in jail time as well as
mandatory exclusion. hey may also face
pressure from corporate boards or shareholders to “take one for the team.”36
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Second, a plausible defense under the
RCO doctrine is extremely diicult. he
government need only prove that the
executive had supervisory authority at
the time the underlying violations took
place to convict senior executives of an
RCO ofense. Moreover, although Park
created the defense of objective impossibility,37 such a defense is impractical
because “Even if the most thorough
and assiduous supervision produced no
evidence of a problem, it would always
be objectively possible for a CEO, who
has authority over an entire company, to
have prevented wrongdoing.”38
hird, “before an organization pleads
guilty, all counsel should scrutinize
language in the statement of the ofense
to reduce the quantity as well as the
quality of admissions that could be used
against an executive” not only at sentencing, but also in a debarment or exclusion
proceeding.39 Companies that want to
protect their executives from exclusion
may want to refuse agreeing to plea facts
“suggesting false, misleading or deceptive
promotional practices by the company.”40
Fourth, executives may be less likely to
plead to misdemeanors without assurances from OIG as to exclusion. As a
result, defense counsel will have to focus
on achieving a global resolution early on
in the negotiation process by engaging
all government agencies involved, and if
possible, to negotiate a waiver of exclusion/debarment.41 Accordingly, counsel
should request a decision from OIG about
exclusion before any individual or organization pleads guilty, similar to how corporate defendants negotiate the terms of
their CIAs before entering criminal pleas
or civil settlements. “his request should
be made even when an investigation is
closed without a guilty plea because the
OIG’s authority to seek permissive exclusion does not require a criminal convicFDLI

tion.”42 OIG likely will “resist the request
for an advance decision about exclusion
by claiming that it cannot exercise its
discretion until ater the resolution of
criminal and civil matters.”43
his argument, however, is problematic because OIG makes decisions about
exclusions for companies before such
cases are resolved by knowing enough
about the investigation to accept the
terms of the CIA. Moreover, the case of
Michael Dinkel is precedent that OIG
will make a decision about exclusion
before accepting a settlement.44 Additionally, defense counsel may “argue
that a timely decision about exclusion is a
matter of due process because the parties
need to evaluate the true impact of a proposed agreement with the government.”45
If OIG continues to refuse, defense
counsel should negotiate a way to limit
“the number of individuals or the types
of positions that might be considered
for permissive exclusion,”46 and should
ask OIG to render exclusion decisions
“within a certain period of time so that
the organization and the individuals can
plan their futures accordingly.”47
Ultimately, the Friedman case underscores “the government’s expectation
that upper management be actively
involved in ensuring corporate compliance with federal healthcare laws and
regulations.”48 Moreover, the case is
a warning to individuals that a guilty
plea could potentially result in exclusion if OIG inds that there is a factual
connection relating to fraud. Accordingly, healthcare stakeholders will need
“to work proactively with OIG prior to
accepting a guilty plea to better assess
whether an exclusion proceeding may
occur subsequent to conviction.”49 Additionally, corporate executives should
become integrally involved in their
company’s compliance eforts to ensure

that airmative steps are being taken to
minimize the risk of misconduct. FDLI
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